21 January 2006
No Victory, No Peace
I read No Victory, No Peace
quickly once I got my hands on it last September. I had been following Angelo Codevilla’s essays closely and was looking forward to this collection. It does not disappoint. There is tension between the author and some of his critics in the essays that are not explained in the text, but readily apparent to the reader. The author explains his purpose and timing:
“I began these essays in the fall of 2001 because it seemed to me that the George W. Bush team’s failure to formulate a plan for victory was contrary to the principles of warfare. Its collective mind was muddled. After the murder of some 3,000 Americans, it would surely do something. But what? Against whom? To what end? All too soon it was clear that the team had no idea, or too many ideas, and that the result would be incompetence.”
The author goes on to note that he waited to publish the book after the 2004 elections to prevent it from coming across as partisan. Competence and incompetence are nonpartisan. The author makes the case that the Bush team never established what they were after, or how they would get it. Terrorism is bad and democracy is good, but how do we get the peace we desire?
Really, I would like to simply copy and paste the book. It is a classical take on the prosecution of war, our war, and our current failings on these scores. The author repeats, again and again, that war has two outcomes: victory or defeat.
“Common sense does not mistake the difference between victory and defeat: the losers weep and cower, while the winners strut and rejoice. The losers have to change their ways, the winners feel more secure than ever in theirs. On September 12th, 2001, retiring Texas Senator Phil Gramm encapsulated this common sense: “I don’t want to change the way I live. I want to change the way they live.”
Codevilla pulls no punches, and his criticisms all strike true: “The U. S. governments’ ‘War on Terror’ has three parts: ‘Homeland Security’, more intelligence, and bringing al-Qaeda ‘to justice’. The first is impotent, counter-productive, and silly. The second is impossible, the third is misconceived and a diversion from reality.”
Throughout, Codevilla emphasizes the importance of regimes, and destroying those that would wish us harm, the enemy. We won’t even identify the enemy regimes, such as the Wahhabis or the Baathists. The Saudi royalty are not devout and live non-Muslim lives. Codevilla recommends letting other Muslims destroy them, and most provocatively revoking the property rights over the Saudi oil fields.
Codevilla decisively highlights a path to lasting peace, if we can only stomach the price of the war. Victory does not come on the cheap, despite whatever the President attempts to sell us.
quickly once I got my hands on it last September. I had been following Angelo Codevilla’s essays closely and was looking forward to this collection. It does not disappoint. There is tension between the author and some of his critics in the essays that are not explained in the text, but readily apparent to the reader. The author explains his purpose and timing:“I began these essays in the fall of 2001 because it seemed to me that the George W. Bush team’s failure to formulate a plan for victory was contrary to the principles of warfare. Its collective mind was muddled. After the murder of some 3,000 Americans, it would surely do something. But what? Against whom? To what end? All too soon it was clear that the team had no idea, or too many ideas, and that the result would be incompetence.”
The author goes on to note that he waited to publish the book after the 2004 elections to prevent it from coming across as partisan. Competence and incompetence are nonpartisan. The author makes the case that the Bush team never established what they were after, or how they would get it. Terrorism is bad and democracy is good, but how do we get the peace we desire?
Really, I would like to simply copy and paste the book. It is a classical take on the prosecution of war, our war, and our current failings on these scores. The author repeats, again and again, that war has two outcomes: victory or defeat.
“Common sense does not mistake the difference between victory and defeat: the losers weep and cower, while the winners strut and rejoice. The losers have to change their ways, the winners feel more secure than ever in theirs. On September 12th, 2001, retiring Texas Senator Phil Gramm encapsulated this common sense: “I don’t want to change the way I live. I want to change the way they live.”
Codevilla pulls no punches, and his criticisms all strike true: “The U. S. governments’ ‘War on Terror’ has three parts: ‘Homeland Security’, more intelligence, and bringing al-Qaeda ‘to justice’. The first is impotent, counter-productive, and silly. The second is impossible, the third is misconceived and a diversion from reality.”
Throughout, Codevilla emphasizes the importance of regimes, and destroying those that would wish us harm, the enemy. We won’t even identify the enemy regimes, such as the Wahhabis or the Baathists. The Saudi royalty are not devout and live non-Muslim lives. Codevilla recommends letting other Muslims destroy them, and most provocatively revoking the property rights over the Saudi oil fields.
Codevilla decisively highlights a path to lasting peace, if we can only stomach the price of the war. Victory does not come on the cheap, despite whatever the President attempts to sell us.
